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“If professional baseball players, whose achievements are endlessly watched, discussed 
and analyzed by tens of millions of people, can be radically mis-valued, who can't be?  If 
such a putatively meritocratic culture as professional baseball can be so sloppy and 
inefficient, what can't be?” 
--Michael Lewis, author of Moneyball:  The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, 
as quoted in Neyer (2003) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
  Each year, major league baseball teams risk enormous sums to sign amateur 
players to their first professional contracts.  For example, 29 “blue-chip” prospects 
selected in the first round of baseball’s 2004 amateur draft received guaranteed signing 
bonuses totaling nearly $57 million.  In the great majority of cases, however, teams 
receive little or no return on these investments.  According to one reputable survey 
(Callis, 2003), just one of every four first-round picks ultimately makes a non-trivial 
contribution to a major league team, and a mere one in twenty becomes a star.  Though 
signing bonuses are lower for players drafted in later rounds, so are the chances that these 
investments will pay off.  All told, only eight percent of players drafted in the first ten 
rounds (of a 50-round, 1,500-player draft) typically develop into big league regulars, and 
only after a lengthy apprenticeship in the minor leagues.  In addition, the sport’s annual 
draft, which clearly aims to limit players’ bargaining power by granting their drafting 
teams exclusive negotiating rights for a year, only applies to amateur players in the 
United States.  Foreign-born players—now about a quarter of those on major league 
rosters and about a third of those in the minors—may bargain with any team prior to 
signing their initial professional contracts, and thus often negotiate bonuses equal to or greater than those of top domestic draftees (though data on the amounts paid to such 
players and their chances for eventual success are sketchy). 
  This high-uncertainty, high-stakes market provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the way individuals value risky choices.  There is abundant experimental 
evidence that when people form judgments about probability they depart systematically 
from the laws of statistics (see Camerer, 1995, for a review of this literature and Camerer, 
1998, for an update).  There is also experimental evidence that—in auctions involving 
considerably less uncertainty than in the baseball labor market—bidders are subject to a 
“winner’s curse” in which they realize below-normal profits because they systematically 
over-value available goods (see Kagel, 1995, for a review of this literature, and Cox, 
Dinkin, and Smith, 1999, for an argument that this evidence is more limited than 
previously supposed).  Critics of the experimental approach argue, however, that the 
incentives commonly present in a laboratory setting may be inadequate to induce subjects 
to incur the costs that optimal behavior might require, and that the real world provides 
both greater incentives to behave efficiently and more opportunities to learn how.  Thus, 
there is much to be learned from field studies of economic decision-making.  It is in this 
spirit that we offer the present study. 
  There is certainly reason to suspect that behavior in the market for aspiring 
professional ballplayers might be consistent with the theory of bounded rationality, which 
stresses that agents often have incomplete knowledge of available alternatives and 
computational abilities too limited to solve for theoretical optimum values (Simon, 1986), 
and/or with prospect theory, one implication of which is that low-probability events tend 
to be overweighted by decision-makers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).  Decisions about 
  3whom to draft or sign domestically and internationally are based on information from 
experts—“scouts”—who directly observe only a fraction of the available pool of talent, 
and often for just a few games.  There is anecdotal evidence that scouts bring certain 
biases to the evaluation process and are excessively influenced by their most recent 
observations of their subjects.
1  Further, in conveying their evaluations of available 
players to the ultimate decision-makers, scouts often use analogies linking prospects’ 
traits to those of established major-leaguers.  While this practice facilitates economical 
communication, it might contribute to overestimation of an individual amateur’s real 
probability of making the majors; indeed, given the data summarized earlier, one wonders 
why clichés like “blue-chip prospect” or “can’t-miss prospect” are even part of baseball 
lexicon.  Finally, teams face an information asymmetry in judging the health, motivation, 
and, remarkably, even the age
2 of a prospect. 
   Accordingly, our primary task in this study is to assess whether the bonuses teams 
pay for available amateur talent are efficiently priced.  In the next section, we begin by 
summarizing relevant characteristics of the baseball labor market.  In brief, the sport’s 
collective bargaining agreement grants teams a fairly lengthy period over which they may 
recover the costs of acquiring and developing talent by paying players wages below their 
net marginal revenue products.  Section III details the methodology and data used to 
                                                 
1 For an “inside” look at the scouting and drafting functions, see Lewis (2003), chapters 2 and 5.  A best-
selling business journalist, Lewis was granted unprecedented access to the front office of the Oakland 
Athletics, a team committed to discovering and exploiting market inefficiencies in order to compete with 
better-financed rivals. 
2 Amid heightened security checks following the 9/11 terror attacks, it was found that numerous foreign-
born players had understated their true ages when signing their initial contracts.  The incentive to do so is 
clear:  scouts forecast a player’s future potential by making age-adjusted assessments of ability, so bonus 
payments are generally higher for younger players of a given perceived talent level.  In 2002, for example, 
the Arizona Diamondbacks were willing to pay $500,000 to sign a pitcher they thought was a 17-year-old 
named Adriano Rosario of the Dominican Republic.  In 2004, they learned that the player was actually 
three years older and named Tony Pena; he had assumed the identity of a younger nephew at the time he 
was signed.  See Price (2004). 
  4examine the benefits and costs of teams’ investments in amateur players, and Section IV 
presents results.  We find that though three-quarters of first-round draftees yield zero 
returns, the rest generate payoffs high enough to justify the enormous bonuses paid.  On 
average, the expected annual return on these investments approaches 33 percent. 
  Given the monopsony power inherent in the draft system, however, finding that 
yields on top picks are attractive probably should not be a surprise and certainly is not a 
powerful test of the rationality of bidders; rather, it is a benchmark useful for evaluating 
their other choices.  What is surprising, and suggestive of irrationality, is that we find 
differences in expected returns for players from various cohorts, and that these 
differences are contrary to the predictions of financial theory.  Teams pay significantly 
higher bonuses to high school first-round draftees despite the fact that college selections 
deliver returns more quickly.  As a result we calculate an IRR of 43 percent for college 
selections and 27 percent on high school draftees.  In addition, the yield on pitchers is 24 
percent and 41 percent for position players—despite the fact that the former face 
considerably greater injury risk than the latter.  Finally, expected returns fall precipitously 
for the lower-quality investments that teams make in their second- and third-round 
draftees.  In sum, it appears that teams systematically over-estimate many prospects’ 
probability of success and/or fail to appropriately adjust their bets to take account of 
longer odds. 
In Section V, we present some anecdotal and historical information about bidding 
behavior outside the context of the draft (i.e., under more competitive conditions).  We 
find that when teams lack the monopsony power the draft confers, it is not at all unusual 
to find that bonuses rise quickly to levels that drive expected returns below zero.  Section 
  5VI summarizes our findings—which are quite consistent with the experimental literature 
supporting bounded rationality or prospect theory
3—and offers concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Institutional background and basic model 
  When a major league baseball team pays a multi-million dollar signing bonus to a 
top draft choice it is placing a large bet, returns on which are both highly uncertain and 
long deferred.  Even if a draftee beats the odds (which are, again, 3-to-1 against a first 
round pick, lengthening to 9-to-1 against a second rounder and 15-to-1 against a third-
rounder) and becomes a contributing big-league regular, this accomplishment generally 
will follow a minor-league apprenticeship that almost always lasts years.  Should this 
apprenticeship produce a successful major leaguer, however, his employer will earn 
sizeable monopsony rents thanks to the collective bargaining agreement that governs the 
baseball labor market.  Competitive bidding may drive wages to equality with workers' 
marginal revenue products in other labor markets, but ballplayers cannot auction their 
services to the highest bidder until they have accumulated six years' major league service.  
During this monopsony phase of a player's career, he usually will be paid far less than his 
marginal revenue product. 
  Prior studies (e.g., Marburger (1994, 2004) and Burger and Walters (2005)) have 
estimated that employers keep over two-thirds of a player's marginal revenue product for 
                                                 
3 Our findings are also consistent with empirical literature that has found over-bidding on initial public 
offerings (IPOs) of shares by previously closely-held firms.  For example, Ritter (1991) found that IPO 
issues during 1975-84 substantially underperformed a sample of matching firms from the closing price on 
the first day of trading to their three-year anniversaries.  Ritter and Welch (2002) reached a similar 
conclusion for issues during 1980-2001.  In that sample, over-eager buyers drove up first-day prices by an 
average of 18.8 percent, so that an investor buying shares at the first-day closing price and holding them for 
three years underperformed the market by 23.4 percent.  Evaluating the copious literature seeking to 
explain this market anomaly is well beyond the scope of this paper, but our findings hint that cognitive 
psychology might have a part to play. 
  6those with three or fewer years of big-league service, with the exploitation rate declining 
thereafter as a result of an arbitration process that is also a by-product of baseball's 
collective bargaining agreement.  Only after this six-year period may a "free agent" 
player auction his services to the highest bidder, presumably receiving rewards 
commensurate with his expected net marginal revenue product.
4  The primary question of 
this study is whether the rents extracted from players prior to their eligibility for free-
agency are high enough to justify both the initial signing bonuses (paid not just to those 
who become big-league regulars but to the majority of draftees who never make the 
majors) and the lengthy delay in receipt of these rents. 
  As illustrative examples of the rewards and risks of the baseball draft, consider 
the first players selected in 1990 and 1991.  Larry “Chipper” Jones received what appears 
in retrospect to be a bargain-basement signing bonus of $328,000 (in real, 1998 dollars) 
from the Atlanta Braves in 1990.  Jones's minor-league apprenticeship (which included 
some down time due to injury, another significant element of risk in this market) lasted 
until 1995, when he became a big-league regular.  According to reasonable estimates of 
his output and the value of that output to his employer (explained in more detail below), 
Jones's marginal revenue product for the Braves was $6.13 million in 1995 (again, in real, 
1998 dollars) and averaged $8.4 million for the next five seasons.  But his real salary 
increased from a mere $120,000 in 1995 to $4.59 million by 2000.  Thus, thanks to the 
unique structure of the baseball labor market, the Braves realized significant rents during 
each of Jones’s first six big-league seasons, summarized in Figure 1.  By contrast, in 
                                                 
4 Exactly why the players' union has ceded such monopsony power to teams in successive collective 
bargaining agreements is a subject of some debate.  While some argue that it is a way to allow teams to 
recover presumed costs of developing players during their apprenticeships, the union has also expressed the 
belief that limiting the availability of free agency raises overall wages, at least to star players.  See Fort 
(2003, p. 259). 
  71991 the Yankees paid Brien Taylor a then-record bonus of $1.8 million (in 1998 
dollars).  But due to an off-field injury to his pitching shoulder two years later, Taylor 
never appeared in a major league game, a fate shared by over one-third of top draft picks 
and two-thirds of those drafted in the first ten rounds.  The Yankees’ enormous 
investment in Taylor was a total loss. 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
  In what follows, we evaluate teams’ draft investments by calculating an internal 
rate of return (IRR) on their bonus outlays.  Rather than calculate returns on specific 
players like Jones or Taylor, however,
5 we employ historical data to make generalizations 
about the probability that a particular draft pick will pay off, the normal waiting period 
for doing so, and the typical size of realized returns.  In general terms, the payoff for a 
successful draft choice will be a stream of future rents R per year t, where: 
t t t w NMRP R − = ,        (1) 
and NMRP denotes a player's net marginal revenue product and w his wage.
6  The present 
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where t0 represents the interval between the date the player is drafted and the time it takes 
him to reach the majors and i denotes the appropriate discount rate. 
                                                 
5 Calculating individual returns is problematic for several reasons, chiefly (a) unavailability of information 
on individual bonuses for sufficiently many players to produce an adequate sample size, and (b) the 
computational issues arising when such a large fraction of investments produce an IRR of -100 percent.  
Thus, we consider a probabilitistic approach to be superior in these circumstances. 
6 While it is true that there are additional player development costs during a prospect’s apprenticeship 
period, these are not relevant to our evaluation. The costs of coaching and the modest salaries paid to minor 
leaguers, for example, are the same for a top draft pick as for a 50
th-round pick;  the question before us is 
whether it makes economic sense to pay a large bonus to secure a “blue chip” prospect, for minor league 
rosters can be filled out with lower-round picks not requiring such payments. 
  8  Since a draftee may never make the majors, however, and since the quality of his 
performance may vary considerably even if he does, equation (2) must be refined.  The 
probability- and quality-weighted present value of the expected rents generated by a draft 
choice may be expressed as: 
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where pj is the probability of drafting a player of quality j. 
  In sum, we can calculate the IRR on draft-choice investments if we can estimate 
the probability (p) that draftees will make the majors, the length of time it typically takes 
to do so (t0), and the magnitude of the annual rents (R) successful draftees deliver to their 
teams.  The latter will, of course, depend on the quality of their performance (j) over the 
six years prior to eligibility for free agency and the rate of monopsony exploitation during 
this period.  Setting PV equal to the typical bonus outlay, we can solve for the discount 
rate i (the IRR) on such bonuses. 
 
III.  Detailed methodology and data 
  Applying this approach to a statistically meaningful sample of players requires 
that, first, we quantify the probability that a given draft choice will become a productive 
major league player and, second, we differentiate drafted players according to their 
ultimate quality.  Fortunately, Callis (2003) has done both, evaluating 2,115 players 
drafted in the first ten rounds over eight years (from 1990 to 1997).  Callis, a veteran 
talent evaluator and executive editor for a leading baseball journal, identified those who 
failed to make the major leagues (67.1 percent of his total sample, which he dubbed 
  9"flops") and sorted successful draftees into five qualitative categories, from those who 
merely "got a cup of coffee" in the majors (17.1 percent), to "fringe" players (7.8 
percent), on up to “stars.”  For our purposes, only the top 3 categories are relevant:  those 
who became "regular" (5.1 percent of the total sample), "good" (2.1 percent), or "star" 
quality players (0.9 percent).  In general, draftees who fail to become at least major 
league regulars will not generate positive cash flow for their teams. 
  Given the Callis (2003) sample of 1990-1997 draft choices, we then are able to 
calculate the number of years between draft day and major league debut (t0) for players in 
each of the three relevant quality classifications.  Since signing bonus information for 
later rounds is less available and less accurate, we focus on the first three rounds of the 
draft.  As we might expect, stars tend to reach the majors sooner than good players, who 
in turn usually serve shorter apprenticeships than regulars.  Table 1 displays this and 
other summary statistics for first-round draftees; later, we will discuss the characteristics 
of second- and third-round draftees and examine other issues teams face in making their 
selections and bidding appropriately. 
We next quantify the contributions of players of the relevant quality levels to their 
teams' performance, a necessary step toward calculating their marginal revenue products 
and contributions of rents to their teams.  In our view, the best overall measure of players' 
physical productivity is Bill James' Win Shares statistic (James and Henzler, 2002), 
which aggregates all of the myriad ways a player can contribute to his team's 
performance (with his bat, glove, arm, and legs) into a single statistic, which is 
effectively the player's marginal contribution of wins to his team.  This measure also has 
the virtue of dovetailing neatly with the traditional economic approach to measuring 
  10players' marginal revenue products, devised by Gerald Scully (1989), which involves 
multiplying a player's marginal output of wins by his team's marginal revenue from extra 
wins.  We tabulate the marginal output of wins by each successful draftee in the three 
relevant quality categories; as Table 1 shows, on average stars were nearly twice as 
productive as good players, who were in turn twice as productive as regulars. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
  We next combine these estimates of players' marginal output of wins with 
estimates of the marginal value of wins to their teams in order to quantify players' 
marginal revenue products during their first six years in the major leagues.  This requires 
estimation of a revenue function for a representative team.
7  We use data on local revenue 
over 1995-2001 for all major leagues teams, available from the Commissioner's Blue 
Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics (Major League Baseball, 2000) and a later update 
(Major League Baseball, 2001), to estimate the following linear revenue function via 
ordinary least-squares regression: 
TR = -92.02 + 6.18t + 6.96M + 1.15W + 38.41STAD – 2.63AGE + ε.   (4) 
                   (17.79)  (1.25)   (1.75)     (0.21)      (9.33)            (1.53)      
 
Standard errors are in parentheses, while TR signifies local team revenue in millions of 
inflation-adjusted dollars (base year = 1998), t is a time trend, M is a measure of market 
size (SMSA population, in millions), W signifies team wins, STAD is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of one if the team plays in a new, state-of-the-art stadium, and AGE 
is the number of years such a stadium has been in use.  The coefficient on W implies the 
                                                 
7 Burger and Walters (2003) showed that both the intercepts and slopes of teams’ revenue functions vary 
according to the size of their markets, so marginal win values are higher in larger markets.  At this point, 
however, since our goal is to calculate IRRs for representative players taken in different draft rounds, we 
rely on an "average" marginal win value.  We will return to the question of how market size affects bidding 
behavior later, in Section 4. 
  11marginal value of a win was $1.15 million on average during the 1995-2001 sample 
period. 
Based on this estimate, we could calculate players' gross marginal revenue 
products, á la Scully, simply by multiplying their marginal output of wins by this $1.15 
million marginal-revenue-per-win figure.  However, Burger and Walters (2005) find that 
free agents' market-determined salaries are typically about 80 percent of their gross 
marginal revenue products.  In effect, teams appear to adjust downward the wages they 
are willing to pay in competitive markets in recognition of non-trivial marginal costs of 
employing particular players—most significantly, perhaps, the costs of insuring (or self-
insuring) against injury.  In this study, failure to take this fact into account might produce 
upward-biased estimates of the rents that may be extracted from successful draftees, and 
upward-biased estimates of the rate of return on investments in draftees in general.  
Accordingly, we estimate the net marginal revenue product (NMRP) of successful 
draftees as: 
) * 8 . 0 ( * MWV MP NMRP t t = ,      (5) 
where MP denotes the player's marginal product in wins, and MWV equals the marginal 
revenue delivered by each extra win for a representative team. 
  Finally, to calculate estimated wages for successful draftees, we first assume these 
players earned the league minimum salary in years one and two of their careers (when 
they are not eligible for arbitration, and therefore face their teams' unrestrained 
monopsony power).  Then, in years three through six of players' careers, we estimate that 
their wages rise (and their monopsony exploitation rate declined) in accord with the 
typical ratio of the salary awarded by arbitrators to a player's net marginal revenue 
  12product, as presented in Burger and Walters (2005).  The equation for a player's 
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  Based on the foregoing data and assumptions, we proceeded to evaluate the 
efficiency of teams' decisions to invest in high draft picks during the late 1990s. 
 
IV.  Results 
  Table 2 presents the typical stream of rents that a representative team can expect 
to extract from successful draftees in the three relevant quality categories.  For example, a 
star-caliber player may be expected to produce a net marginal revenue product (NMRP) 
of $7.4 million per year (or 80 percent of his expected gross marginal revenue product, 
equal to roughly eight marginal wins per year times $1.15 million per win) during the 
monopsony phase of his career.  This phase normally begins 2.22 years after he is 
drafted, after which his estimated wage (w) rises from the league minimum to roughly 
$3.79 million, yielding rents (R) to his team ranging from $7.1 million down to $3.6 
million per year.   
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
Thus, drafting a future star delivers enormous returns—but since the probability 
that even a first round draft pick will become a star is a mere 4.3 percent, and since both 
future stars and flops will command multi-million dollar signing bonuses, evaluating the 
wisdom of such investments requires the calculation of probability- and quality-weighted 
  13present values of these prospective rents (as specified by equation (3), above).  Our 
preferred method of evaluation involves setting the present value expression (equation 3) 
equal to the typical bonus payment and solving for the internal rate of return (IRR) on 
draft investments. 
In order to perform a benchmark IRR calculation we must settle on an appropriate 
benchmark first-round bonus.  A high degree of variation in team revenue over time and 
in bonuses paid by draft rank within rounds represent complicating factors.  Our marginal 
win value of $1.15 million is based on equation (4) estimates of the revenue function 
using 1995-2001 data.  For consistency, we base our IRR calculations on the median 
bonus for this same time period.  First, we model the variation in first round bonuses 
within and across years (1995-2001) by estimating the following regression
8: 
ε β β β α + + + + =
2
3 2 1 ) ln( Slot Slot Year realbonus ,     (7) 
where bonus data are in real 1998 dollars, Year allows for a time trend, and Slot specifies 
the draft position (one for the first pick, two for the next, and so on).  We model the 
natural log of bonus payments because a simple linear regression suffers from serially 
correlated errors.  The square term on draft slot allows for the observed nonlinear decline 
in draft bonuses as one progresses deeper into the first round. 
Coefficient estimates for equation (7) are presented in Column (1) of Table 3.  
This simple model explains over 68 percent of the variation in first-round bonuses for our 
seven-year sample.  The Year coefficient indicates an annual rate of increase in real 
bonuses of almost 12 percent, holding draft position constant.   The Slot coefficients 
reveal a nonlinear decline in bonus payments based on draft position.  Taken together, the 
                                                 
8 Following Callis (2003), we define the first round to include supplemental picks.  Unfortunately, bonus 
data were not available for supplemental first rounders in 1995-97, but were available for 1998-2001. 
  14coefficients suggest that dropping one slot costs a player 5.5 percent at the top of the first 
round, but only 3.5 percent in the middle of the round (at the 20
th slot). 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
A benchmark IRR:  The median first-round pick 
   The midpoint of our bonus sample is 1998, and the midpoint of round one 
(including supplemental picks) in 1998 is represented by pick 22.  Combining these 
values with the coefficient estimates of equation (7) yields an estimate of $1.02 million 
for the first-round median bonus payment.  Setting PV in equation (3) equal to that figure, 
we find that the IRR (i) for the representative first-round pick is just under 33 percent. 
  Despite the fact that over three-quarters of first-round choices are failures, then, 
we find that the successes generate rents large enough to amply repay the lavish signing 
bonuses paid to all.  Note, however, that this is only weak evidence of rational bidding by 
teams.  While the estimated annual rate of return on the typical first-round bonus seems 
attractive, one must remember that (a) it is certainly enhanced by the monopsony power 
granted to teams by virtue of the draft’s structure and (b) the high risk and unusual 
distribution of returns in this market prevent a definitive judgment about whether this 
benchmark IRR is comparable to alternative available investments.  All we can say about 
behavior in this unique market thus far is that teams are both willing and able to assess 
their risks and constrain their bids in such a way that the dollars they invest in first-round 
draftees generate a yield of roughly 33 percent.   
But history suggests important differences in the characteristics of draftees from 
different cohorts.  For example, players with college experience are more physically 
  15mature, and their future performance may therefore be easier to forecast; players at 
certain positions also face greater risk of injury.  The key question is whether teams are 
able to make appropriate choices or bids given such variety in the assets available to 
them.  We proceed by testing for heterogeneity in characteristics of players from different 
cohorts, and when statistically significant differences are found (e.g., in the probability of 
success) we replace the benchmark average characteristics and re-compute the IRR.  Our 
results show that returns on certain types of players are far higher than on others, hinting 
at the existence of market inefficiencies and suggesting that teams could improve their 
performance by pursuing undervalued assets or avoiding overvalued ones. 
 
 The high school anomaly 
  The benchmark IRR of 33 percent for first-round draftees is an average return on 
players from two separate talent pools with distinctive characteristics.  At the least, high 
school draftees are younger and less experienced than those who have chosen to attend 
college rather than sign professional contracts.  Some organizations favor drafting the 
former, thus enabling them to begin training their prospects at a relatively young age, but 
this strategy has been questioned by analysts who believe that focusing on college players 
mitigates information problems (leading to fewer drafting errors) and reduces the length 
of apprenticeships in the minors.
9
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
  Table 4 displays summary statistics for first-round draft choices from high school 
and college.  The probability of drafting a “regular” or better is very similar at 27.6 
                                                 
9 Bill James, one of the founding fathers of the field known as “sabermetrics”—the statistical analysis of 
baseball—has famously opined that “college players are a better investment than high school players by a 
huge, huge, laughably huge margin” (as quoted in Lewis, 2003, p. 99). 
  16percent for high school draftees and 26.8 percent from the college pool.  Employing Z-
tests for the difference between two proportions we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality in probabilities within each quality class.  The only significant difference in 
Table 4 is displayed in the middle column: college draftees reach the majors more 
quickly, as one might expect. 
  Given the greater speed with which college players make the majors, one might 
expect that teams would be willing to pay a premium to sign a player with college 
experience; our bonus regression, equation (7), allows a test of this hypothesis.  The 
second column of Table 3 reports, instead, a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the college dummy variable, implying that teams selecting a college player 
receive roughly a 10 percent discount, holding draft position constant.  The model 
predicts a median bonus of $1.068 million for a high school player and $961 thousand for 
the median college player.
10  After factoring in this college bonus discount and the 
shorter deferment period we use equation (3) to calculate a 43 percent IRR for college 
players and a 27 percent return for high school selections. 
  This finding of lower returns on high school selections lends some credibility to 
the analysts’ critique that teams tend to overvalue high school players.  That is, they 
appear to spend too many of their first-round picks on high school players, and/or they 
fail to adjust downward the bonuses they are willing to pay high school draftees to 
compensate them for the longer wait for a payoff. 
                                                 
10 Higher average bonuses for high school players could result from a greater propensity to draft them 
earlier in the first round, but we find no systematic differences in the average draft positions of high school 
and college players from 1995-2001.  It is likely that the higher price of high school draftees (holding slot 
position constant) reflects their enhanced bargaining power—i.e., the fact that they can threaten to attend 
college if offered bonuses are deemed inadequate.  In any case, teams should rationally expect such threats 
and select from the two talent pools until anticipated returns from each are comparable. 
  17  In fairness to the teams, however, we should note that time series evidence on 
drafting behavior shows evidence of learning regarding the higher expected returns on 
college draftees.  In 1971, for example, every first-round draftee was a high school 
player, but by 1981 the majority of first-round picks were collegians for the first time.  
Over the 1990-’97 sample period used for this study, the proportions from each pool were 
roughly equal, though recent years have seen a greater predilection for college players.  
In the 2004 draft, for example, 17 of the top 30 picks were collegians, and in 2005 20 of 
the top 30 picks were collegians.  It is too soon to tell, of course, whether expected 
returns on the two cohorts have achieved expected equality, but there is reason to suspect 
they are moving in that direction. 
 
The pitching anomaly 
  Choosing between the college or high school talent pools is not the only complex 
decision a drafting team must make.  There are also important distinctions between 
players of different positions, especially between pitchers and regular position players.  
Pitchers suffer more frequent and more severe injuries than other players, suggesting that 
spending a high draft pick on a pitcher is a particularly risky proposition.  Slicing the 
Callis (2003) draft data another way enables us to quantify the likelihood of successful 
pitching draft choices vis-a-vis other draftees.  Table 5 indicates that the probability of 
drafting a player of good quality in the first round is significantly higher for position 
players relative to pitchers. 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
  18  Adding a pitcher dummy variable to our bonus regression, in column (3) of Table 
(3), we find that there is no evidence that teams reduce their bonus offers to drafted 
pitchers to offset the lower probability of success.
11  Using the median first-round bonus 
of $1.02 million and the significant probability differences from Table 5, we find that the 
IRR for pitchers drafted in the first round is a mere 24 percent, versus 41 percent for 
position players.
12  We conclude that teams over-sample and over-pay the population of 
pitchers available to them in the first round, irrationally foregoing higher-yield 
investments in position players. 
 
The later-round anomaly 
  As the draft proceeds, teams draw from a dwindling supply of talent.  Table 6 
presents bonus information and success probabilities for first-, second-, and third-round 
draft choices.  Clearly, there is a precipitous drop in the probability of drafting a good 
player in the lower rounds—but bonus payments appear to drop less dramatically.  
Indeed, using equation (3) and appropriate data to solve for IRRs by draft round, we find 
that returns drop from 33 percent for first-round picks to 20 percent for second-round 
picks to 13 percent for third-round picks.  The declining observed yields suggest that 
teams hold irrational expectations about these lower-quality prospects’ chances for future 
success, and/or that they fail to appropriately reduce the prices they are willing to pay for 
other, unknown reasons.
13
                                                 
11 Nor is there any evidence that pitchers tend to be drafted later in the round than position players. 
12 These calculations assume the time to reach the majors and physical productivity within each quality 
class are equal for pitchers and non-pitchers.  Productivity of pitchers from the Callis data is actually lower 
than regulars---which would exacerbate the anomaly---but the number of observations is very limited. 
13 By using the median bonus for each round we reduce the impact of outlier bonuses paid to the occasional 
first-round-caliber player who falls to lower rounds because of “signability” concerns by teams. 
  19< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
A possible market-size anomaly 
  Prior research by Burger and Walters (2003) and Krautmann (forthcoming) has 
shown that a player’s marginal revenue product will be positively—and quantitatively 
significantly—affected by the size of the market in which he plays.  In the context of the 
present study, this means that rents earned on successful draftees will be far greater in 
large markets than in small ones.  It would seem rational, therefore, for smaller-market 
teams to negotiate more aggressively to secure lower bonuses in order to achieve IRRs 
commensurate with our estimated benchmark, which presumably reflects an industry-
average opportunity cost of capital. 
  Introducing a market size variable into our draft bonus regression, equation (7), 
allows us to test for this relationship.  The results, reported in column (4) of Table 3, 
indicate that there is no evidence that market size affects the size of bonuses that teams 
are willing to pay their first-round draftees.  It appears, then, that in this market bidders 
pay similar prices for assets which have significantly different values (given differences 
in their revenue-producing capacity).  This might be understandable if draft picks were 
tradable, since teams which attach low value to draftees could simply swap them to teams 
where they have greater value—but for all practical purposes major league rules prohibit 
such transactions.  The absence of a “market-size discount” therefore appears to be 
another anomaly of this market.
14
                                                 
14 There is speculation that small-market teams avoid drafting players who have specified a high pre-draft 
price, instead choosing to draft cheaper players of lower perceived quality.  If true, there would be market-
size-related differences in teams’ draft success rates.  We found, however, a zero correlation between the 
  20  
V.  Anecdotal and historical evidence on bonuses under competition 
  As we have noted earlier, the structure of baseball’s annual draft
15 grants teams 
significant monopsony power,
 enabling them to keep draftees’ bonuses lower than they 
might be if there was open, competitive bidding for available players.  Recent draft 
history provides illustrative evidence on this point.  In 1996, four first-round draft picks 
took advantage of a loophole in the draft’s rules, becoming free agents because their 
drafting teams had missed a specified deadline for making contract offers.
16  In the frantic 
bidding that resulted, the four players received bonuses that averaged over $5 million, 
more than two-and-one-half times the amount paid to the first (and otherwise-highest-
paid) selection in that year’s draft.  What is more important is that this average 
investment far exceeded the “break-even bonus” of $3.25 million that, based on our 
calculations, would produce an expected IRR of zero for the typical 1998 first-round pick 
(given the relevant probability of making the majors, likely length of minor league 
apprenticeship, etc.).  Unless there was genuine reason to fix these players’ chances of 
success far above those of the typical first-rounder—and in hindsight none have become 
stars and only one has become a good major league regular—then their bonuses 
                                                                                                                                                 
market size of teams and their success in drafting star, good, and regular players over the 1990-’97 draft 
years covered by the Callis (2003) sample. 
15 The drafting team has sole negotiating rights to the player and must offer him a contract within 15 days 
of selection. Failure to do so ends the club's rights and the player becomes a free agent, eligible to negotiate 
with any team.  If the player attends a four-year college, the club's negotiating rights are lost as soon as the 
player attends his first class at the end of the summer, but no other club can sign the player until and unless 
it selects him in a succeeding draft. 
16 The players’ drafting teams had missed the aforementioned (note 16) 15-day deadline for tendering 
contract offers.  The players (and the bonuses they eventually received, in nominal dollars) were second 
pick Travis Lee ($10 million), fifth pick John Patterson ($6.075 million), seventh pick Matt White ($10.2 
million), and twelfth pick Bobby Seay ($3 million).  Source:  Simpson (2005). 
  21rationally would have been expected to generate substantial negative returns.  In other 
words, the winning bidders in these four auctions were cursed.
17
  Of course, four observations do not a robust test make, but there are many other 
examples of apparently-extravagant bids for international players, to whom the draft does 
not yet apply.  Several players have been paid amounts far in excess of the break-even 
bonus for first-rounders shortly after defecting from Cuba, which has well-developed 
amateur baseball leagues.
18  Similarly-large bonuses are routinely paid to amateur players 
from other Latin American countries, and recently Asian players have auctioned their 
services to major league teams for sizeable sums, as well.
19  The problem for researchers 
is that bonuses paid in these cases are not reported systematically.  Teams guard the 
information for competitive reasons, and journalists generally take an interest only in 
players who succeed in making the major leagues, or nearly do so.  There is insufficient 
data on the population of international signees who fail to deliver a return on teams’ 
investments in them, so it is impossible to measure success probabilities and average 
apprenticeship periods in order calculate IRRs for this cohort.  Nonetheless, the fact that 
                                                 
17 Another interesting winner’s curse-type question arises from the fact that teams sometimes forfeit top 
draft picks when they choose to sign veteran free agents.  Since bidding for such free agents is competitive, 
one might expect that the returns on such investments are, at the least, bid down toward “normal” levels, 
and certainly below the 33 percent IRR we have estimated for the median first-rounder.  Accordingly, 
forfeiting such picks should be rare—unless free agent salaries are depressed enough to equalize IRRs 
across the two markets.  We suggest this as a topic for future research:  since some free agents can be 
signed without forfeiting draft picks while others cannot (depending on several arcane rules of baseball’s 
free agency system), it would be interesting to see if prices for the latter are appropriately discounted. 
18 According to press reports, in 1996 Livan Hernandez signed for $7.9 million, Rolando Arrojo for $7 
million, and Osvaldo Fernandez for $3.2 million; in 2000 Adrian Hernandez signed for $4 million; in 2001 
Andy Morales signed for $4.5 million; in 2003 Jose Contreras signed for $32 million; in 2005 Kendry 
Morales signed for $10 million (all figures in nominal dollars).  These contracts generally involved some 
combination of a signing bonus and guaranteed salaries over a period of years that make them difficult to 
compare to typical draftees’ contracts.  See Cuban Baseball Defectors (2005). 
19 For example, Venezuela’s Miguel Cabrera obtained a $1.8 million signing bonus in 1999, at age 16; 
South Korea’s Hee Seop Choi received a $1.2 million bonus in 1999 at age 19; Japan’s Ichiro Suzuki, a 
more-established professional, received a $5 million signing bonus and a $4 million salary in 2001, and the 
Seattle Mariners paid his former team $13 million for the right to negotiate with him. 
  22prices in this market so frequently escalate to and beyond the averages for first-round 
draftees hints at a possible over-bidding problem under competition. 
  There is also historical evidence of over-bidding by teams prior to the installation 
of the annual draft system in 1965.  Indeed, the draft was baseball’s third attempt to limit 
the size of bets teams were placing on risky young talent.  From 1946-50 and again from 
1953-57, the sport experimented with a “bonus baby rule.”
20  At the conclusion of WWII, 
competition for players drove up signing bonuses to historically unprecedented levels, 
and team owners responded by requiring that players signed for a bonus above a certain 
amount (which varied from year to year but started at a relatively modest $4,000) must be 
carried on the signing team’s major league roster for two years instead of being assigned 
to a minor-league apprenticeship.  Since these “bonus babies” were generally not ready to 
contribute productively at the major league level, reserving space for them on the 25-man 
roster imposed a sizeable opportunity cost on signing teams; most were willing to carry 
no more than one or two at any one time.  Nevertheless, there were reported bonuses of 
$75,000 in the late ‘40s (equivalent to over $500,000 in 1998 dollars) and $100,000-plus 
bonuses ($650,000 or more in 1998 dollars) were common in the ‘50s.  It was also widely 
suspected that teams evaded the rule in various creative ways (including putting signees’ 
relatives on the payroll).  A new system was therefore adopted in 1957; it allowed bonus 
signees to be drafted by new teams if their signing teams did not protect them on an 
expanded 40-man roster at the end of their first year in professional baseball.  Again, the 
hope was to limit the size and number of large bonuses teams doled out.  But by 1964, the 
                                                 
20 For an excellent review of the evolution of the baseball draft, see Simpson (2005), from whom this 
information is taken. 
  23top bonus paid had reached $205,000 (roughly $1.08 million in 1998 dollars) and the 
current draft system was installed. 
  All else equal, of course, buyers will always prefer monopsony to competition.  
Attempts to suppress competitive bidding are not surprising.  The relevant question here 
is whether competition had led to bids that were inconsistent with positive expected 
returns under most plausible assumptions about signees’ legitimate prospects.  There are 
hints that the answer is yes.  In the early 1950s, when the “bonus baby” rule was allowed 
to lapse and bidding was truly competitive, there were many recorded bonuses of 
$100,000 or more.  Since baseball revenues have risen far faster than the general level of 
prices, simply expressing bonuses from that period in real, inflation-adjusted terms 
probably does not convey the extent to which such bids stretched team’s budgets.  Given 
that the average big-league team grossed under $2 million in 1952, a $100,000 bonus 
represented more than five percent of revenue.  By 1998, with average team revenue 
having grown to $82.6 million, a comparable (5.1 percent of gross) bonus would be $4.2 
million, well above our estimated break-even bonus for first-round draftees, discussed 
earlier.  In other words, unless there is reason to suppose that the recipients of the six-
figure bonuses of the early ‘50s had significantly greater chances of success than the top 
picks of the ‘90s, we suspect teams often overbid for their services. 
 
VI.  Concluding remarks 
  In this study of the prices teams pay to sign ballplayers to their initial professional 
contracts, we have found intriguing evidence that decision-makers are prone to 
systematic errors when they must choose among a large number of alternatives and 
  24assign values to investments that may generate sizeable returns but have a low probability 
of doing so.  This is not to say that the multi-million dollar bonuses teams pay their top 
draft picks are typically wasted.  Despite the fact that over three-quarters of these “blue-
chip” prospects are failures, those who succeed produce rents for their teams (in the form 
of marginal revenue products far in excess of their wages) that are sufficient to repay the 
bonuses paid to all draftees.  As a benchmark, the dollars teams invest in the median first-
round pick have an expected IRR of 33 percent. 
  Based on an examination of their behavior during the ‘90s, however, we conclude 
that teams allocate their investment funds inefficiently.  Teams over-value high school 
players relative to college players:  Over the sample period, the expected yield on high 
school players, who have longer apprenticeship periods than college players, was 27 
percent, versus 43 percent for collegians.  Teams over-value pitchers (24 percent 
expected annual return) relative to position players (41 percent).  Teams fail to reduce 
bonuses sufficiently to the lower-quality players drafted in the second round (20 percent 
expected return) and the third round (13 percent).  Smaller-market teams fail to 
aggressively exercise their monopsony power to negotiate lower bonuses commensurate 
with the lower revenues successful draftees will generate in their markets.  Finally, when 
teams must bid competitively for talent (in cases where amateur players are exempt from 
the draft for one reason or another), bonus payments often soar to levels that are 
consistent with negative expected returns. 
  We submit that this evidence supports the view that research in cognitive 
psychology holds promise for enhanced understanding of the market mechanism.  Critics 
of the experimental evidence on the winner’s curse, prospect theory, and bounded 
  25rationality tend to be suspicious of studies of behavior under controlled conditions where 
stakes are low and there may be inadequate opportunities for learning by decision 
makers.  Neither problem applies here.  This market involves multi-million dollar 
decisions, and teams’ interest in making them efficiently is reinforced by their desire to 
win on the field as well as maximize wealth.  Further, baseball’s annual draft is now 40 
years old.  Though we have found some evidence that teams learn from prior mistakes 
(e.g., by slowly reducing their propensity to draft high school players over the years), the 
magnitude and persistence of the inefficiencies we have identified suggest that they are 
not merely a by-product of ordinary “friction” in the process of equilibration, but 
symptomatic of deep-seated biases in decision making.  Clearly, teams over-estimate 
their ability to identify successful prospects from the high school cohort, among pitchers, 
and as they reach deeper into the talent pool.  Without greater access to teams’ 
deliberative processes, we can only speculate about the precise reasons for such biases, 
but the behavioral literature provides an abundance of possibilities. 
  For example, teams’ over-valuation of high school players may be a by-product of 
what Tversky and Kahneman (1986) have labeled nontransparent dominance.  In an 
experimental setting, Tversky and Kahneman found that subjects asked to choose 
between two alternative “lotteries” had no difficulty identifying the one with the higher 
expected value when the uncertain payoffs were arranged so that subjects could narrow 
things down to the probabilities or payoffs that made the dominant choice transparent.  
But when the same choices were rearranged, making the comparison of probabilities and 
payoffs more complex, 58 percent of subjects chose the inferior alternative.  Dominance 
can be, in the words of Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. S265), “masked by a frame in 
  26which the inferior option yields a more favorable outcome in an identified state of the 
world.”  In their experiment, many subjects saw that two of three outcomes in the 
dominated alternative looked more favorable than in the dominant one—and failed to 
consider that the third outcome made all the difference.  This is similar to the choice 
teams face between high school players and collegians, with the probabilities and payoffs 
shown in Table 4.  It appears that high school draftees are more likely than collegians to 
become stars or good players, and that collegians merely have a better chance to become 
regulars.  But, even apart from the statistical insignificance of all these differences (itself 
a possible cause of nontransparent dominance), we now know that this appearance is 
misleading—and that collegians have much higher expected returns because they arrive 
in the majors sooner. 
  We should note in closing, however, that there is considerable historical evidence 
that the participants in this market recognize the difficulties and potential pitfalls they 
face in choosing among so many highly uncertain alternatives.  Indeed, the current draft 
system is actually major league baseball’s third attempt to cope with teams’ chronic 
tendency to over-value untried players.  We have found that, in general, the draft does 
exactly that.  The fact that the players’ union has never attempted to significantly alter the 
system (despite its monopsonistic character) hints that the union shares the view that 
competitive bidding for amateur players might not enhance the sport’s viability.  If teams 
still make systematic errors in some ways in this market, they are at least rational enough 
to be looking for institutions to limit the damage from whatever root causes of 
misjudgment exist. 
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  30Table 1 




Probability of Pick 
Achieving Quality 
Category (p) 
Mean Number of 
Years to Reach 
Majors (t0) 
Mean Number of 
Marginal Wins per 
Season (MP) 
Star  4.3% 2.22 8.05 
Good  8.3% 2.88 4.63 
Regular  14.0% 3.13  2.28 
 
  31Table 2 
Time profile of potential rents on successful draftees, by quality category 
 
STAR t  NMRP w  R 
(p=0.043) 2.22 7.41  0.3  7.106 
 3.22  7.41  0.3  7.106 
 4.22  7.41  1.777  5.629 
 5.22  7.41  2.607  4.799 
 6.22  7.41  3.614  3.792 
 7.22  7.41  3.792  3.614 
       
       
GOOD t  NMRP w  R 
(p=0.083) 2.88 4.26  0.3  3.957 
 3.88  4.26  0.3  3.957 
 4.88  4.26  1.022  3.235 
 5.88  4.26  1.498  2.758 
 6.88  4.26  2.077  2.179 
 7.88  4.26  2.179  2.077 
       
       
REGULAR t NMRP w  R 
(p=0.14) 3.13 2.09  0.3  1.795 
 4.13  2.09  0.3  1.795 
 5.13  2.09  0.503  1.592 
 6.13  2.09  0.737  1.357 
 7.13  2.09  1.022  1.072 
 8.13  2.09  1.072  1.022 
 
Notes:  p = probability of a draft pick achieving each quality class, t = time in years after initial signing, 
NMRP = net marginal revenue product, w = expected salary in millions, and R = expected rents in millions 
of dollars per year. 
 
  32Table 3 
Regression equations explaining variance in first-round bonus payments 
 















































Pitcher     -0.004 
(0.037) 
 
Market      -0.009 
(0.008) 
Adj. R
2  0.682 0.692 0.690 0.692 
 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the natural log of the real (1998 $) bonus.  Standard errors in parentheses, ** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Summary statistics for first-round high school and college draftees, 1990-97 
 
 
High School Draftees 
Quality 
Category 
Probability of Pick 
Achieving Quality 
Category (p) 
Mean Number of 
Years to Reach 
Majors (t0) 
Mean Number of 
Marginal Wins per 
Season (MP) 
Star  4.8% 2.44 8.86 
Good  10.3% 3.56
** 5.16 











of Years to Reach 
Majors (t0) 
Average Number 
of Marginal Wins 
per Season (MP) 
Star  4.0% 1.97 7.11 
Good  6.7% 1.84
** 3.83 





Notes:  Z-tests on the college and high school probabilities (p) fail to reject equality of proportions for each 
of the three quality classes.  For time deferment (t0) and productivity (MP) t-tests of equality of means for 
the college/high school cohorts were conducted and ** indicates rejection at the 1 percent significance 
level. 
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Pitchers  2.67% 2.67%
**  16.67% 
All Others  5.96% 13.91%
**  11.26% 
 
 
Note:  Z-tests on the equality of pitcher and non-pitcher probabilities (p) were conducted for each quality 
class. ** indicates rejection at the 1 percent significance level for equality of proportions. 
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Table 6 


















First  $1.02M 4.3%
  8.3% 14.0% 










Notes:  Median bonus for first round is based on data from 1995-2001; bonuses for second and third rounds 
are based on 1998 data.  Probabilities are based on Callis (2003) survey covering 1990-’97 drafts.  ** and * 
indicate rejection at the 1 and 5 percent significance levels respectively on a z-test for equality of 
proportions compared to first round. 
 Fig. 1:  Rents Captured from a Successful Draftee:
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